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Migrant achievement penalties in Western Europe. 
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University of Turin, Department of Economics and Statistics 
 
Abstract: This paper presents a comparative examination of educational underachievement of 
second-generation immigrants in Western Europe near the end of compulsory schooling, 
based on the 2006-2009 waves of the PISA survey. We propose a measure for migrant 
educational penalty revealing the relative position of migrant children within the achievement 
distribution of natives with the same socio-economic background. We find that migrant 
specific disadvantage is severe in most Western European countries. We then analyze how 
this measure varies across countries and find it negatively related to the effect of socio-
economic background on natives’ achievement. Hence, migrant penalties and socio-economic 
penalties come forth as two distinct dimensions of educational inequalities. By means of 
recursive partitioning methods, we explore whether features of educational systems account 
for cross-country differences in migrant-specific penalties. We find that institutional 
dimensions theoretically related to educational careers of children of immigrants – entry age 
into (pre)school and degree of marginalization in low-performing schools –matter, in spite of 
the more or less comprehensive character of the secondary school systems. 
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1. Introduction 
International assessments on students’ competencies show that in most European countries 
migrant educational underachievement is a serious issue. In the last years, public debates have 
called attention to the need of identifying characteristics of schooling systems able to tackle 
migrant educational inequalities. Indeed, endowing children of migrants with equal chances to 
succeed in school compared to their native peers is seen as a major step toward their 
economic and social integration. 
Research on ethnic educational inequality within the sociology of education has extensively 
explored its individual and family determinants (Heath and Brinbaum, 2007). Home 
resources, parental social class and qualifications explain the educational disadvantage of 
migrant children to a significant extent (Kristen and Granato, 2007; Van De Werfhorst and 
Van Tubergen, 2007). However, even after accounting for family background, a residual 
disadvantage persists (Rothon, 2007), sometimes labeled as ethnic “penalty” (Heath, Rothon, 
and Kilpi, 2008). Comparative works have shown that educational penalties associated with 
migrant status differ among European countries (Schnepf, 2007), even when same-origin 
migrants are contrasted (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie, 2012; Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara, 
2012).  
Less clear from previous research is the extent to which features of educational systems can 
be called in to explain such cross-country differences. A well established literature in the 
economics of education has identified some institutional features able to explain why 
countries differ in the way educational achievement is affected by socio-economic status 
(Hanushek and Wössmann, 2011). For instance, the degree of horizontal differentiation – and 
in particular age at first tracking – has been consistently found to increase educational 
inequalities driven by family background (Brunello and Checchi, 2007;  Schütz, Ursprung, 
and Wössmann, 2008; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). Just like socio-economically 
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disadvantaged families, immigrant families are likely to suffer from a lack of culturally 
relevant resources crucial to make informed school choices, hence early tracking systems 
might be specifically detrimental to children of migrants. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that, given prior achievement, students with an immigrant background tend to make 
more ambitious educational choices with respect to their native peers (Kristen, Reimer, and 
Kogan, 2008; Cebolla Boado, 2011; Jackson, Jonsson, and Rudolphi, 2012). This positive 
“secondary effect” (Boudon, 1974) might have different origins, from unrealistic wishes of 
upward mobility to anticipation of discrimination on the labor market (Salikutluk, 2013). 
Therefore, the role of horizontal differentiation per se in explaining cross-country differences 
in migrant achievement penalties is not straightforward.  
More generally, do conventional institutional accounts of socio-economic differentials in 
school achievement help in understanding why children of migrants suffer from more or less 
severe penalties in different receiving societies? Is migrant specific disadvantage just another 
facet of socio-economic disadvantage, or rather are they distinct dimensions of educational 
inequality? 
In this paper, we present a comparative analysis of the relative educational disadvantage of 
second-generation immigrants in Western Europe based on PISA 2006 and 2009 surveys on 
mathematics literacy of 15-year-old students. We single out migrant specific disadvantage 
from overall migrant underachievement with a measure revealing the relative position of 
migrant children within the achievement distribution of natives with the same socio-economic 
background. We then explore how migrant penalties and socio-economic penalties vary 
across countries. Finally, we investigate whether features of schooling systems theoretically 
related to educational careers of second-generation immigrants matter in explaining cross-
country differences in migrant penalties. 
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2. Analytical strategy 
When looking for an institutional explanation of cross-country differences in migrant 
achievement, there are several caveats to bear in mind. The first one is the need to balance a 
sufficient degree of comparability across receiving societies with an adequate sample size. 
Indeed, even if analyses are based on a large number of individual observations, the relevant 
sample size to identify institutional effects is the number of countries. The second challenge is 
related to compositional effects: migrant students differ along a number of characteristics 
liable to affect educational achievement, such as socio-economic background, length of stay 
in the receiving society and origin country. These characteristics are not evenly distributed 
among immigrant populations, hence they may act as confounders when we try to isolate 
migrant specific disadvantage and compare it across countries. Finally, we should 
acknowledge the possibility that these institutional features may operate interactively rather 
than additively in shaping cross-country differences in migrant underachievement. 
Other scholars (Fossati, 2011; Schneeweis, 2011; Cobb-Clark, Sinning, and Stillman, 2012; 
Dronkers, Heus and Levels, 2012) have recently addressed similar research questions. They 
estimate either country-level models for the achievement gap or individual-level regression 
models for test scores pooling countries together, with institutions as independent variables. 
These studies take a step forward in shedding light on how features of educational systems 
relate to migrant learning disadvantage. However, they incur in a number of problematic 
issues in their analytical strategies. The first limitation of these works is that, in order to 
increase the number of observations, they gather countries which differ greatly not only in 
their educational systems, but also in their societal structure. This lack of comparability 
hinders the explanatory potential of these studies. Moreover, the selected countries display 
very heterogeneous origin-country composition of the immigrant populations, resulting in 
different degrees of cultural and linguistic distance liable to affect educational achievement of 
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children of migrants. Unfortunately, international surveys on cognitive abilities generally do 
not collect detailed data on the origin country. Failing to account for these compositional 
effects poses a second threat to the identification of institutional effects1. While these studies 
control for socio-economic background and migratory status (first- vs. second-generation 
immigrants), they do not always differentiate first-generation according to their age at arrival 
in the country. More generally, first-generation immigrants are less comparable than second-
generation, because part of their educational career has developed in their origin country. 
Finally, in order to limit the number of parameters, restrictive assumptions are posited in the 
regression specifications. For example, Schneeweis (2011) and Fossati (2011) assume 
constant effects of institutions on the two migrant categories. Instead, Cobb-Clark, Sinning, 
and Stillman (2012) fix the social background effect across countries, an assumption that is 
hardly tenable in light of the evidence that the effect of social background varies considerably 
between early and late tracking countries (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). Most 
importantly, the effects of the features of educational systems are always assumed to be 
additive. 
In this paper, we address the above mentioned challenges in the following way. First, to attain 
greater comparability of receiving societies, we limit our sample to Western European 
countries since their societal and institutional structures have been harmonized to a significant 
extent by the process of European integration. Moreover, they share a history of post-war 
labor immigration, as opposed to traditional settlement countries like the US or Australia. 
Even so, migrant populations across Western Europe are diverse. Hence, we substantiate our 
analyses by contrasting same-origin immigrants across receiving societies. We analyze 
educational achievement of second-generation immigrants in 17 countries of Western Europe 
and then, by narrowing our focus to those which provide information on the country of birth 
of students, we check the robustness of our findings by contrasting migrant penalties for 
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children of Turkish immigrants only. Finally, we introduce a country-level indicator of 
linguistic distance between origin-countries and destination-countries official languages. In 
order to address the remaining composition effects, we control for socio-economic 
background and we focus on second-generation migrants, who have been entirely exposed to 
the schooling and preschooling system of the receiving country, just like their native peers. 
Finally, we adopt a two-step analytical strategy allowing for the greatest flexibility of 
parameters: first, we estimate migrant achievement penalties with individual-level regressions 
run separately for each country; second, we analyze the cross-country variability of migrant 
penalties. Our cross-country analyses are based on recursive binary partitioning methods. We 
do so – instead of estimating restrictive cross-country regression models – for two reasons: (i) 
to explore how different combinations of theoretically relevant institutions can explain cross 
country differences in migrant achievement penalties; (ii) to unambiguously adopt a 
descriptive perspective, that does not lead to generalize results outside the set of countries 
under investigation, since this set is interesting per se and cannot be thought as a sample 
drawn from a larger population of comparable units. 
3. Migrant achievement penalties in Western Europe 
3.1 Measure 
Migrant underachievement is often operationalized with the average gap of migrants with 
respect to natives. We propose an alternative measure which reveals the average position of 
migrant children (M) into the distribution of their native peers (N), expressed in terms of 
standard deviations. We define the “raw z-score” as:                                                                        
̅ =
1
, =

, − 

 =

 − 

  
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The interpretation of ̅ is straightforward. For instance, a z-score of –0.5 implies that if we 
place the average migrant into the distribution of natives, she would score 0.5 standard 
deviations below the average. Assuming normality, this positions her in the 31st percentile 
rank of the distribution of natives. The basic difference between the z-score metrics and the 
average gap is that the former also considers the existing variability in the receiving societies. 
Given the mean difference between migrant and native children in terms of PISA scores, lack 
of integration of migrants is more severe in a society with less heterogeneity among native 
children, as on average migrant children would perform not only substantially worse than the 
average native, but also worse than lower performing ones.  
To isolate the migrant-specific disadvantage, we account for compositional effects due to 
socio-economic endowments X and use a modified version of the above z-score revealing the 
average position of second-generation migrants in the distribution of natives with the same 
socio-economic status. This index – emphasizing the relative rather than absolute distance 
between scores of natives and migrants – will be our measure of migrant achievement 
penalty. The “controlled z-score” is defined as: 
̅ =
1


,, − 
|
|
=̅|	|

 
where n is the number of migrants, ̅| is the z-score for given x and | is the proportion 
of migrants with X=x. Instead of evaluating ̅  completely non-parametrically, we refer to a 
simple model of performance Y:  
 =  +  +  −  +  − 	 +                                       (1) 
where D is a dummy indexing migrant background,  and  the intercepts for migrants 
and natives respectively,   and  the corresponding effects of socio-economic status. In 
this case: 
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̅ = ∑ !"+
#$%−"+#$%&$ '(|)
 =
∑ −+"#−#%*$
       (2) 
Incidentally, the numerator of (2) coincides with the unexplained component of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition of the absolute differential: 

 − 
 =  −  + "+ − +% + + −  
The last term represents the portion of the gap ascribable to compositional effects. Instead, the 
first two terms remain unexplained. If X is expressed in terms of deviation from the mean, the 
difference between the intercepts is the migrant-native gap for the average X, while the second 
term accounts for different returns to socio-economic status between migrants and natives.2  
3.2 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) dataset 
Analyses are based on representative data from the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) collected in the years 2006 and 20093. PISA assesses 15-year-old 
students’ competences in three domains: reading, mathematics and science. Test scores are 
standardized on a common scale (OECD countries mean is 500 with a standard deviation of 
100) allowing us comparing student achievement across countries. Moreover, individual, 
family and school background information is collected through questionnaires administered to 
students and school officials. PISA samples are derived from a two-stage stratified sampling 
procedure with schools selected in the first stage and individual students selected in the 
second one4. 
3.3 Variable construction and individual-level regressions 
Our sample units are 15-year-old students over 17 Western European countries.5 Since 
mathematics literacy is less influenced by lack of linguistic skills than reading and science, 
we use the former as the educational outcome of main interest. This choice has the advantage 
of limiting compositional effects due to the origin country. Nonetheless, to gain leverage, we 
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replicate analyses on the two other literacy domains assessed by PISA.  We define migrant 
categories according to information on place of birth provided by PISA: g2 are second-
generation migrants (native-born students with both foreign-born parents). Natives (students 
with at least one native-born parent) is the residual category, while first-generation migrants 
(foreign-born students with both foreign-born parents) are excluded from the sample. To 
operationalize the various dimensions of family background potentially affecting educational 
achievement, we used a synthetic measure provided by PISA: the index of economic, social 
and cultural status (ESCS). This is derived from three indices: highest occupational status of 
parents, highest parental education and home possessions – which in turn comprises items on 
the family wealth, cultural possessions and educational resources scales, as well as the 
number of books at home. 
In order to compute the controlled z-score as a measure of migrant educational penalty, we 
run country-specific individual-level regressions on mathematics score over the dummy 
variables for migrant status, a dummy for female, the ESCS index and – where significant6 – 
an  interaction between ESCS and the dummy for migrant status.  
Descriptive information on the sample sizes and summary statistics on the dependent variable 
and controls for natives and second-generation migrants can be found in Tables A1-3 in the 
Appendix. 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Results of the estimation of performance scores for each country are shown in Table 1. 
 −  is the mean difference in the scores of migrants and natives at ESCS=0 (the 
OECD average), while  is the effect of one additional point in the ESCS scale for natives; 
where the interaction coefficient  −  is non-significant,  −  is the mean 
difference at all values of ESCS. Results of analyses on reading and science literacy are 
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reported in Tables A4-5 in the Appendix and prove to be generally consistent with those on 
mathematics. 
[Table 1 about here] 
As expected, in all countries immigrants perform substantially worse than their native peers. 
Yet, differentials vary greatly across countries, from 10 PISA points in England and Wales to 
56 in Belgium-Flanders. The socio-economic background also has large effects on 
educational achievement, for both native and migrant students. In countries where the 
interaction term is significant, it is generally negative, meaning that migrants benefit less than 
natives from a high endowment of socio-economic resources. However, when significant, 
interaction terms are rather small with respect to the coefficients associated to the migrant 
dummy, indicating that underachievement of second-generation immigrants is not so much 
driven by differential returns to socio-economic resources, but rather by the lack of other 
resources (e.g. linguistic, cultural, relational).  
How do these results translate in terms of our measures of migrant disadvantage? As shown in 
Figure 1, raw z-scores provide a clear-cut picture of how severe is the issue of migrant 
underachievement in Western Europe: in most countries, second-generation migrants lie 
below the 30th percentile of the distribution of natives, despite being born in the receiving 
society and having been entirely exposed to its educational system. In Belgium-Flanders and 
Denmark the situation is critical, since the average second-generation migrant scores about 
0.8 standard deviations less than the average native, lying around the 20th percentile of the 
distribution of natives. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Sharp cross-country differences exist, not only among levels of general underachievement, 
but also in the extent to which they are explained by socio-economic resources differentials. 
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In the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France, underachievement is more than halved when 
accounting for such differences, while in Finland, Portugal, Italy and Spain more than three 
quarters remain unexplained. Our measure of migrant educational penalty – the controlled z – 
reveals that the average second-generation migrant child lies below the 35th percentile of the 
distribution of natives with the same socio-economic resources in Finland, Portugal, Belgium-
Flanders, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Sweden and Germany. The least unequal 
countries for migrant achievement penalties are Greece, England-Wales, France, Luxembourg 
and Belgium-Wallonia. 
Let us now consider how migrant achievement penalties are related to a traditional indicator 
of educational inequality: the effect of socio-economic status on natives’ educational 
achievement7.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
As shown by Figure 2-left, not only migrant-specific penalties do not coincide with socio-
economic penalties, but they are negatively correlated in our sample of countries. This 
counterintuitive finding has relevant implications for cross-country analyses aimed at 
explaining migrant underachievement. Previous work implicitly assumed that the two effects 
go in the same direction, when including institutional variables related to socio-economic 
background in their explanatory models. However, the above mentioned findings should be 
interpreted as a call for a deeper reflection on the features of educational systems that may be 
specifically beneficial or detrimental to students of migrant origin. 
Yet, cross-country variability of migrant penalties could be driven by compositional issues. 
This is why we contrast students with Turkish immigrant mothers across seven receiving 
societies, for which the information on birth country of parents is available and sample sizes 
are large enough. Figure 2-right shows that the ranking of most countries is left unchanged, 
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with the exception of Belgium-Flanders. The inverse relation with socio-economic penalties 
holds true, and appears to be even stronger: therefore, even if compositional effects are in 
place, they are not responsible for the negative correlation. 
To summarize, cross-country differences in migrant achievement penalties exist and cannot 
be reduced to compositional issues. Therefore, there is room for characteristics of educational 
systems in explaining such variability. Moreover, since migrant penalties and socio-economic 
penalties emerge as two distinct dimensions of educational inequalities, an in-depth reflection 
is needed in order to theoretically derive those dimensions of educational systems liable to 
specifically affect the underachievement of second-generation migrants. 
4. What role for educational systems? 
4.1 Theoretical background, mechanisms and variable construction 
In this section, we reflect on the micro-foundations of educational inequalities for children of 
migrants, moving from five theoretically relevant dimensions of educational systems: (i) 
national standardization, (ii) horizontal stratification, (iii) school segregation, (iv) migrant 
participation rates in preschool and (v) start of compulsory education. We then argue that the 
underlying mechanisms through which these dimensions may affect migrant educational 
achievement can be traced back to two encompassing aspects: marginalization in low-
performing schools and entry age into the (pre)school system. We operationalize the latter 
two with synthetic indicators. Since some dimensions of educational systems are likely to be 
particularly salient when migrants have to cope with a lack of language skills, we also 
introduce a country-level indicator of linguistic distance. 
National standardization: According to Allmendinger (1989), it is the degree to which the 
quality of education meets the same standards nationwide. This dimension is relevant for 
educational inequalities because curricula differentiation and disparities in the allocation of 
13 
 
human and financial resources may contribute to the creation of a low quality sector in the 
school system. However, it might prove explanatory of migrant achievement penalties only 
insofar immigrant students are disproportionately concentrated in this low-quality sector. 
Horizontal stratification: Again according to Allmendinger (1989), we define it as the degree 
of differentiation within given educational levels. Tracking into differentiated curricula is 
considered to be detrimental to the egalitarian character of educational systems, since 
educational choices depend on strategic information and cultural capital (Müller and Karle, 
1993). Moreover, empirical evidence consistently indicates that early tracking increases 
educational inequalities driven by socio-economic background (Hanushek and Wössmann, 
2011). Even controlling for socio-economic status, immigrant families are likely to suffer 
from lack of information and cultural resources relevant to cope with destination-countries 
educational systems. Nevertheless, students with an immigrant background seem to make 
more ambitious educational choices given prior achievement (Kristen, Reimer, and Kogan, 
2008; Cebolla Boado, 2011; Jackson, Jonsson, and Rudolphi, 2012). Hence, horizontal 
differentiation might be relevant for migrant penalties only as long as immigrant students are 
disproportionately concentrated in vocational tracks and these tracks are low-quality. 
School segregation: It is defined as the uneven distribution of individual characteristics (e.g. 
socio-economic, immigration or ethnic background) across schools. Segregated schools might 
exacerbate educational inequalities, firstly because they will tend to have bad quality 
teaching, since teacher sorting often disadvantages already deprived schools (Kalogrides, 
Loeb, and Béteille, 2013). Indeed, highly qualified teachers have an incentive and means to 
leave troublesome schools and what is more, a higher turnover is associated with less 
effective teaching (Wyckoff and Boyd, 2005).  
Secondly, students may negatively influence each other’s performance, i.e., “peer effects” 
might be in place (Hoxby, 2000). When considering migrant school segregation, additional 
14 
 
problems might arise, e.g. teachers’ adaptation to children with different cultural and 
linguistic background may slow down the learning pace. However, previous literature on 
European countries has found little evidence of a substantial impact of migrant concentration 
on educational outcomes (Cebolla Boado, 2007; Cebolla Boado and Garrido Medina, 2011; 
Brunello and Rocco, 2011; Agirdag, Van Houtte, and Van Avermaet, 2012; Contini, 2013). 
Ultimately, the segregation of migrant children is an issue insofar it relegates them into 
marginal sectors of the schooling system, with low-quality teaching, low performance targets 
and low-quality peers, as the exposure to such environments is likely to limit aspirations and 
expectations about future life prospects and detriment the development of academic skills. 
Hence, we argue that the mechanisms according to which national standardization, horizontal 
stratification and school segregation could affect migrant penalties are all triggered by the 
marginalization of second-generation migrants into low-performing schools. Moreover, the 
uneven concentration of migrant children in low-performing schools can only have three 
explanations. The first two relate to different forms of segregation: migrant-specific school 
segregation – due to residential segregation or to the explicit school choices made by the 
families – and social segregation, relevant if migrants are disadvantaged even in terms of 
socio-economic status. The third reason involves the existence of formal or informal ability-
based entry barriers to the more prestigious schools or educational programs; this is related to 
standardization and stratification. If none of these mechanisms were operating, children 
would be randomly allocated to schools, and their chances to end up with well or bad 
performing peers would be the same for all of them.  
Therefore we collapse these three dimensions into the single variable of marginalization of 
second-generation migrants into low-performing schools. We compute the latter as the 
relative risk for second-generation migrants (vs. natives) of attending the lowest-performing 
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group of schools (situated in the 10th percentile of the achievement distribution according to 
PISA average scores on all literacy domains). 
Migrant participation rates in preschool: Preschool attendance has been found to have a 
positive effect on cognitive development, especially for disadvantaged children (Currie, 2001; 
Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Magnuson, Lahaie, and Waldfogel, 2006; Felfe and Hsin, 
2012). Our expectation is that it is even more beneficial for children of immigrants because it 
provides formal and informal contexts to improve their linguistic skills in the official idiom of 
the destination country (Christensen and Stanat, 2007). Moreover, early socialization with 
native peers could reduce cultural distance and lack of information experienced by their 
families (Schofield, 2006). Empirical evidence, though limited to some studies conducted in 
the US and Germany, suggests that preschool attendance can boost educational opportunities 
for immigrants (Spiess, Büchel, and Wagner, 2003; Crosnoe, 2007; Biedinger, Becker, and 
Rohling, 2008). 
Start of compulsory schooling: Mechanisms similar to those associated with preschool 
attendance might be triggered by an early start of compulsory schooling. Moreover, a formal 
educational context provides additional learning opportunities for children suffering from a 
lack of cultural resources at home, as it is often the case for children of migrants.  
Again, in reason of the similar mechanisms underlying these dimensions, we operationalized 
migrant participation in preschool and start of compulsory schooling with a single variable, 
measuring the average entry age into the (pre)school system for second-generation 
immigrants born in 1993. The latter combines individual information on years of preschool 
attendance retrospectively assessed by PISA and the official starting age of compulsory 
primary schooling for our cohort of interest (Eurydice, 2000: 65–66). 
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Linguistic distance: A decisive factor for immigrant students school performance is given by 
their linguistic skills in the language of instruction (Esser, 2006) and these skills are likely to 
be affected by the distance between the instruction language and the mother tongue. We 
expect the above mentioned features of educational systems to be particularly beneficial to 
children of immigrants with a distant native tongue from the official language of the 
destination country. In particular, early entry in the educational system might be decisive for 
those children, since cognitive sciences have shown that the ability to learn a foreign language 
decreases sharply with age (Birdsong, 2006). 
Therefore, we construct an indicator of linguistic distance between origin-countries and 
destination-country official languages, assessed according to the Encyclopedia of Languages 
(Lewis 2009). For details on the construction of this indicator, refer to Table A6 in the 
Appendix.  
Table A7 reports the figures for each explanatory variable used for cross-country comparison. 
4.2 Regression trees 
In § 3 we have shown that Western European countries display different degrees of migrant 
achievement penalty (i.e. net of socio-economic resources) and that these cross-country 
differences cannot be reduced to compositional effects related to the origin country of 
immigrants. Therefore, characteristics of educational systems can be called in to explain such 
variability. We are aware that cross-country comparisons in most cases cannot identify causal 
effects, since other countries’ outcomes cannot provide credible counterfactuals. Hence, we 
exploit the rich PISA database with an explorative purpose, to examine the relation between 
the system-level features – average age at entry in the (pre)school system, marginalization 
into low-performing schools and linguistic distance – which we consider theoretically 
relevant for migrant achievement penalties. 
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Preliminary simple regressions on country-level data have shown that all the estimated effects 
go in the expected directions, although only the coefficient of age of entry is relevant in size 
and statistically significant.  
Against this evidence, we use regression trees, a multivariate data technique that recursively 
partitions data space into smaller regions, according to the one binary question which 
minimizes the sum S of squared deviations from the subgroup means in the response variable. 
Each parent node is further divided into child nodes, and the procedure is repeated until the 
largest decrease in S is below a given complexity threshold8. Regression trees are particularly 
useful to detect complex interaction patterns, for which we have no a priori assumptions. The 
approach is exploratory rather than confirmatory and it is entirely data driven. The following 
caveat holds. The set of countries we analyze is interesting per se, and cannot be conceived as 
a random sample drawn from a hypothetical population of units; for this reason, we are not 
too concerned at this stage with issues like over-fitting and generalizability of results.   
4.3 Results 
Figure 3 depicts results of the regression tree analysis. As a guidance to the interpretation of 
the tree, note that variables with the best predictive power are those generating splits at the 
higher level nodes and that show up again in subsequent divides, while those appearing for 
the first time in the lower level nodes are usually less important. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In the first step, countries are split according to the average entry age in the (pre)school 
system. In the right branch we find late-entry countries (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, 
Portugal), all exhibiting severe migrant penalties (0.44 to 0.75). In the left branch, where age 
at entry is low to medium, the picture is more complex. This group is further divided 
according to marginalization of migrants. On the one hand, highly marginalizing systems 
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(Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Belgium-Flanders) all display severe migrant penalties 
(0.41-0.50). On the other hand, in Greece, where marginalization is very low, migrant 
penalties are close to zero (0.14). Moderately marginalizing systems display greater internal 
heterogeneity: indeed, Italy is set apart in reason of its rather delayed entry age and displays a 
severe penalty (0.45). The remaining countries (England and Wales, France, Luxembourg, 
Belgium-Wallonia, the Netherlands, Spain and Norway) all display fairly mild penalties 
(0.15-0.33). Nevertheless, they are further differentiated at lower-level splits, which are all 
consistent with our theoretical expectations. The case of England and Wales, with very early 
entry age and very low penalties (0.15), closes the tree as the lowest node. 
These results are overall consistent with our theoretical predictions.  Entry age in the 
(pre)school system stems as the most relevant variable in explaining cross-country differences 
in migrant penalties: it drives the first split and it emerges as a discriminating factor in further 
divides. As expected, earlier entry is associated to milder migrant penalties. Second order 
splits are driven by marginalization in low-performing schools, which is generally associated 
with more severe penalties. However, for a single observation (Finland), the split goes in the 
unexpected direction. Contrary to our anticipations, linguistic distance does not emerge as a 
variable of split. However, linguistic distance is relevant to differentiate countries according 
to migrant penalties in the other domains of literacy assessed by PISA, as appears from 
additional analyses performed on reading and science. Results of regression trees on these 
domains are reported in Figures A1-A2 in the Appendix and are generally consistent with our 
theoretical expectations. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the issue of migrant educational disadvantage in Western 
Europe. By using the 2006-2009 waves of PISA survey on mathematics literacy of 15-year-
old students, we have provided new descriptive evidence on where second-generation 
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migrants are positioned within the achievement distribution of their native peers. We have 
shown that achievement penalties associated to migrant status are severe in most Western 
European countries, even after controlling for socio-economic resources. However, cross 
country variability exists in the extent to which migratory status affects the relative 
achievement of students. We have drawn attention on one finding in particular: the negative 
correlation between socio-economic and migrant penalties, a result that is substantiated with 
additional analyses on Turkish migrants in selected destination countries. Hence, migrant 
penalties and socio-economic penalties come forth as two distinct dimensions of educational 
inequalities. 
The additional analyses on Turkish migrants have also shown that the observed cross-country 
differences in migrant educational penalties cannot be fully attributed to the diversity of 
origin countries, leaving scope for the role of institutional features in determining such 
penalties. We have reflected on the micro-foundations of migrant penalty in order to derive 
institutional dimensions that may matter in explaining its variability. By means of recursive 
partitioning methods, we have assessed how theoretically relevant features of educational 
systems combine with each other and with the dimension of linguistic distance in producing 
more or less severe migrant penalties. 
Our exploratory analyses point at entry age into the (pre)school system as a major institutional 
factor behind cross-country differences in migrant achievement penalties. This finding was 
already hinted at by Schneeweis (2011) and can be understood in terms of a positive effect of 
early instruction on subsequent schooling performance, which is likely to be particularly 
beneficial to children of migrants, given their lack of cultural resources specific to the 
receiving society. Indeed, we find that systems characterized by late entry – Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden – exhibit severe migrant penalties, despite the extremely 
comprehensive character of their secondary school. It is worth mentioning that in 
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Scandinavian countries socio-economic resources affect educational outcomes to a relatively 
low extent. The absence of tracking into differentiated curricula and the high degree of 
national standardization of their educational systems may benefit native students with poor 
socio-economic background, but may not be sufficient to promote equal educational 
opportunities for second-generation immigrants, who could be harmed in the first place by 
late entry in (pre)school. This interpretation seems plausible, especially when we consider that 
in Scandinavian countries linguistic distance is generally high and early socialization with 
native peers is crucial to improve second-language skills. Moreover, Norway – similar in all 
other respects to other Scandinavian systems – displays a substantially lower entry age into 
the (pre)school system and milder achievement penalties for migrants. On the other side of 
the spectrum, in countries where second-generation immigrants access the educational system 
very early – England and Wales and the Netherlands – they are less likely to suffer from large 
achievement penalties. 
Another relevant element in explaining cross-country differences is the degree to which 
second-generation immigrants are marginalized in low-performing sectors of the school 
system. This aspect encompasses several features of educational systems, such as horizontal 
differentiation into separate tracks, school segregation and lack of national standardization. 
Previous works have found inconsistent evidence in favor of the relevance of social or 
migrant segregation (Schneeweis, 2011) and age at tracking (Cobb-Clark, Sinning and 
Stillman, 2012; Dronkers, Heus and Levels, 2012) to explain cross-country differences in 
migrant underachievement. Our results suggest that – when dealing with migrant specific 
educational disadvantage – tracking into different curricula is not a discriminating factor per 
se. Indeed, among countries which track their students before age 15 (Austria, Flemish and 
Wallonian Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) those 
displaying particularly severe migrant penalties are very marginalizing, as opposed to those 
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displaying milder penalties. Hence, we find evidence that horizontal differentiation matters, 
but only in so far it directly affects the educational opportunities of children of migrants, 
namely when it entails a disproportionate concentration of migrant students in low-quality 
tracks.
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List of tables 
Table 1. Estimates of individual-level regressions of mathematics scores 
country  −    −  
Austria -38.11** (5.44) 40.37** (2.13)   
Bel. Flanders -56.43** (9.73) 44.63** (1.59) -23.79** (6.07) 
Bel. Walonia -30.21** (6.61) 51.80** (2.28) -21.00** (5.19) 
Switzerland -39.51** (3.12) 34.25** (1.36)   
Germany -41.15** (4.84) 45.33** (1.80) -15.35** (4.00) 
Denmark -40.26** (4.82) 32.52** (1.32) -9.39* (3.90) 
England+Wales -10.86** (4.00) 40.8** (1.58)   
Spain -25.80** (6.59) 28.45** (0.97)   
Finland -54.27** (12.04) 28.58** (1.17)   
France -33.31** (6.73) 52.17** (1.81) -19.28** (4.14) 
Greece -10.43  (6.96) 33.88** (1.56)   
Italy -35.77** (8.38) 23.24** (1.41)   
Luxembourg -21.07** (2.66) 29.66** (1.01)   
Netherlands -35.71** (6.00) 38.47** (1.64) -16.94** (3.78) 
Norway -25.41** (7.08) 34.43** (1.53)   
Portugal -40.02** (8.34) 31.57** (1.31) 10.10* (5.14) 
Sweden -34.32** (4.60) 37.56** (1.60)   
Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regressions of math scores estimated using replicate weights and 
plausible values. Model: refer to Equation (1) Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2. 
 ** Sig. at 1% level * Sig. at 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Overall underachievement and migrant achievement penalty  
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Figure 2. Migrant penalty vs. Socio-economic penalty in educational achievement 
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Figure 3. Regression tree of of G2 maths penalties on entry age, marginalization and linguistic distance 
 
Analyses perfomed with package R “rpart”. Method: “anova”, Complexity parameter 0.01. To improve the 
readability of the graph, migrant achievement penalties are reported as absolute values. 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Sample sizes used by country and migratory status 
 
Country Natives G2 migrants (all origins) Turkish G2 migrants 
Austria 9838 869 330 
Bel. Flanders 8859 380 104 
Bel. Walonia 5277 683 123 
Swizterland 18333 3066 368 
Germany 7692 763 370 
Denmark 8633 1109 375 
England+Wales 13117 556   
Spain 41778 396   
Finland 10228 69   
France 7722 831   
Greece 9004 194   
Italy 18729 306   
Luxembourg 5658 1910   
Netherlands 8414 764  124 
Norway 8606 307   
Portugal 10701 247   
Sweden 7900 609   
Source: PISA 2006-2009, not weighted. As motivated in the Data section, data from Italy exclude South. 
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Table A2. Summary statistics of maths score, by country and migratory status 
 Natives G2 migrants (all origins) Turkish G2 migrants 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Austria 511.1 89.8 444.2 88.9 406.5 77.9 
Bel. Flanders 547.7 92.0 465.1 88.9 451.7 85.8 
Bel. Walonia 507.3 96.2 453.0 95.6 430.7 84.2 
Swizterland 548.3 86.3 489.8 91.0 454.0 88.9 
Germany 521.8 91.2 450.3 92.4 425.6 80.4 
Denmark 514.6 78.6 450.3 79.9 423.9 73.3 
England+Wales 497.4 82.1 480.0 82.5   
Spain 487.5 83.7 457.3 81.2   
Finland 546.3 75.4 490.3 79.9   
France 505.2 90.5 451.8 93.1   
Greece 467.4 83.8 449.7 86.5   
Italy 506.3 82.9 459.3 95.1   
Luxembourg 509.9 83.1 459.5 84.5   
Netherlands 536.3 83.6 474.3 77.7 462.9 69.9 
Norway 498.3 81.8 456.7 90.6   
Portugal 480.1 86.0 440.6 97.4   
Sweden 506.5 83.6 456.2 83.2     
Source: PISA 2006-2009, weighted. As motivated in the Data section, data from Italy exclude South. 
 
 
Table A3. Summary statistics of ESCS, by country and migratory status 
 
 Natives G2 migrants (all origins) Turkish G2 migrants 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Austria 0.226 0.8 -0.477 0.8 -0.850 0.8 
Bel. Flanders 0.256 0.9 -0.637 1.0 -0.978 0.9 
Bel. Walonia 0.291 0.9 -0.285 1.0 -0.773 0.9 
Swizterland 0.208 0.8 -0.340 0.9 -0.688 0.9 
Germany 0.367 0.9 -0.476 1.0 -0.703 0.9 
Denmark 0.370 0.8 -0.446 1.0 -0.885 0.9 
England+Wales 0.221 0.8 0.056 0.9   
Spain -0.278 1.1 -0.366 1.1   
Finland 0.322 0.8 0.246 0.9   
France -0.032 0.8 -0.627 1.0   
Greece -0.041 1.0 -0.258 0.9   
Italy 0.053 1.0 -0.500 1.1   
Luxembourg 0.489 0.9 -0.487 1.1   
Netherlands 0.361 0.8 -0.515 1.0 -0.656 0.9 
Norway 0.482 0.7 0.036 0.9   
Portugal -0.459 1.2 -0.321 1.3   
Sweden 0.334 0.8 -0.043 0.8    
Source: PISA 2006-2009, weighted. As motivated in the Data section, data from Italy exclude South. 
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Table A4. Estimates of individual-level regressions for reading score 
 
 
 
Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regression of reading scores estimated using replicate weights and 
plausible values. Model: refer to Equation (1) Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2. 
 ** Sig. at 1% level * Sig. at 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table A5. Estimates of individual-level regressions for science score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PISA 2006-2009. Country-specific regression of science scores estimated using replicate weights and 
plausible values. Model: refer to Equation (1) Controls: female, ESCS, ESCS*G2. 
 ** Sig. at 1% level * Sig. at 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
Country  −    −  
Austria -37.13** (7.00) 43.81** (1.95)   
Bel. Flanders -61.31** (8.63) 42.43** (1.76) -15.61** (5.77) 
Bel. Walonia -25.71** (7.51) 51.84** (1.96) -20.39** (5.91) 
Swizterland -26.06** (2.64) 34.28** (1.25)   
Germany -40.08** (5.25) 44.14** (1.96) -8.92** (3.92) 
Denmark -31.40** (5.14) 32.20** (1.29)   
England+Wales 0.74 (5.14) 43.83** (1.46)   
Spain -6.75 (8.27) 27.18** (1.00)   
Finland -47.66** (11.76) 27.65** (1.07)   
France -25.27** (6.41) 51.66** (2.00) -21.14** (4.79) 
Greece -10.89 (8.25) 35.13** (1.58)   
Italy -36.84** (9.39) 27.78** (1.44)   
Luxembourg -27.95** (3.00) 32.63** (1.09)   
Netherlands -25.00** (6.44) 38.42** (1.54) -12.13* (5.18) 
Norway -23.56** (7.06) 36.48** (1.80)   
Portugal -32.25** (7.48) 31.77** (1.27)   
Sweden -26.20** (4. 69) 36.39*** (1.73)   
Country  −    −  
Austria -53.67** (5.73) 42.24** (1.82)   
Bel. Flanders -66.25** (7.90) 43.39** (1.54) -19.92** (6.15) 
Bel. Walonia -29.58** (7.48) 51.44** (2.02) -23.43** (5.57) 
Swizterland -45.42** (2.87) 35.58** (1.28)   
Germany -57.03** (4.87) 44.25** (1.70) -11.62** (3.45) 
Denmark -48.85** (5.28) 36.00** (1.40)   
England+Wales -10.32* (4.73) 47.61** (1.64)   
Spain -13.68 (7.13) 28.54** (0.97)   
Finland -59.81** (13.47) 28.85** (1.16)   
France -34.92** (6.79) 54.03** (1.74) -21.21** (4.26) 
Greece -16.83** (6.05) 33.79** (1.55)   
Italy -46.63** (8.68) 25.39** (1.29)   
Luxembourg -33.78** (3.01) 32.15** (0.96)   
Netherlands -42.77** (7.93) 42.02** (1.49) -16.73** (4.45) 
Norway -41.90** (7.27) 35.17** (1.59)   
Portugal -33.69** (7.65) 29.61** (1.13)   
Sweden -41.22** (5.08) 36.98** (1.46)   
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Table A6 Shares of immigrants according to linguistic distance 
Country 
No distance Mild distance High distance V. high 
distance 
Zero to 
mild 
High to 
very high 
Austria 2.0 0.0 46.2 51.9 2.0 98.0 
Bel. Flanders 1.8 1.8 33.4 63.0 3.6 96.4 
Bel. Walonia 4.5 58.3 8.6 28.5 62.8 37.2 
Switzerland 6.0 0.2 62.8 31.0 6.2 93.8 
Germany 2.5 2.7 41.6 53.2 5.2 94.8 
Denmark 0.0 13.3 8.9 77.8 13.3 86.7 
England+Wales 36.8 30.2 7.5 25.5 67.0 33.0 
Spain 32.1 16.1 42.9 8.9 48.2 51.8 
Finland 0.0 15.5 3.1 81.4 15.5 84.5 
France 2.5 65.0 15.2 17.3 67.5 32.5 
Greece 12.3 0.0 28.3 59.4 12.3 87.7 
Italy 0.7 19.1 43.8 36.4 19.8 80.2 
Luxembourg 2.9 8.5 77.5 11.1 11.3 88.7 
Netherlands 22.2 1.2 14.9 61.7 23.5 76.5 
Norway 2.2 5.5 0.0 92.3 7.7 92.3 
Portugal 80.1 9.6 0.0 10.3 89.7 10.3 
Sweden 0.0 16.0 39.4 44.6 16.0 84.0 
Distance is assessed according to the encyclopaedia of languages Ethnologue (Lewis 2009) as follows: if the two 
languages coincide to a great extent (ex. U.S. and British English), the distance is set at zero; if they share the 
same linguistic sub-family (ex. Spanish and French as Romance languages), the distance is considered mild; if 
they only share the same family (ex. Polish and French as Indo-European languages), distance is high; if they 
belong to different families (ex. Turkish as Altaic and German as Indo-European), distance is very high. The 
distance is assessed for every single origin-group in each destination-country and then aggregated according to 
the share of each group. We assess the distance between the official language in the country of destination and 
the official language in the country of origin. However, when another language is widely spoken in the country 
of origin, we also assess the distance between the latter and the official language in the country of destination, 
and subsequently increase the distance by one factor. Ex. French as widely spoken in Algeria: linguistic distance 
for Algerians in France: mild. 
For countries where information on the country of birth of the mother was available in the national 
questionnaires, PISA 2006-09 data were used to compute shares of second-generation immigrants with different 
degrees of linguistic distance (Austria, Belgium-Flanders, Belgium-Walonia, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, 
England and Wales, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden). As a second best, we used UN-
DESA data on immigration flows in the period 1975-1993 to proxy origins of parents of second-generation 
immigrants born in 1994 (England and Wales, Sweden). Where no international information on country of origin 
was available, we relied on national statistics: Spain (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración – Ministerio 
del Interior: data on foreign residents aged 16-64 in 2003); France (INED: data on foreign residents aged 25-54 
in 2009); Italy (ISTAT: data on foreign residents in 2003). 
Since two clear-cut clusters of destination-countries emerge, we recode the indicator of linguistic distance as a 
dummy, with 0 indicating zero or mild linguistic distance, and 1 indicating high or very high linguistic distance. 
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Table A7 Explanatory variables at a country level 
Country (Pre)school entry age Marginalization  Linguistic distance 
Austria 4.246 5.542  1 
Bel. Flanders 4.173 3.811  1 
Bel. Walonia 4.186 3.094  0 
Switzerland 4.263 3.137  1 
Germany 4.431 3.445  1 
Denmark 5.386 7.074  1 
England+Wales 3.391 2.436  0 
Spain 4.255 1.509  0 
Finland 5.276 1.209  1 
France 4.107 2.098  0 
Greece 4.581 1.225  1 
Italy 4.403 2.019  1 
Luxembourg 4.184 1.908  1 
Netherlands 3.287 3.051  1 
Norway 4.212 2.198  1 
Portugal 4.651 2.485  0 
Sweden 5.536 3.057  1 
Source: see text, § 4. 
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Figure A1. Regression tree of G2 science penalties on Entry age, Marginalization and Linguistic distance 
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Figure A2. Regression tree of G2 reading penalties on Entry age, Marginalization and Linguistic distance 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Dronkers, Heus, and Levels (2012) explicitly address the compositional issue by including characteristics of the 
origin country. Since this information is available only for a limited number of destination countries, they are 
forced to analyze a reduced but heterogeneous sample. Schneeweis (2011) includes controls for emigration 
macro-regions. However, due to data restrictions, this is only possible for a small number of country-years, while 
the others are recoded as missing dummies. 
2
 Schneeweis (2011: 1283) uses the unexplained component of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as dependent 
variable in her analyses. Note that, differently from her, we do not put much emphasis on differential returns to 
interpret controlled z-scores, as our empirical results show that in all countries the largest part of the unexplained 
component is captured by the difference in the intercepts. 
3
 We first performed separate analyses on the two waves 2006 and 2009. Since results proved consistent, in order 
to ensure greater sample sizes for immigrant students, we rerun the analyses on the pooled waves. 
4
 In order to account for this complex sampling structure, we used the final sampling weights together with the 
80 replicate sampling weights. To obtain unbiased estimates of the standard errors, we also used the five 
plausible values for students’ proficiency, as recommended by PISA (OECD 2009: 129). 
5
 Our initial country selection comprised Austria, Belgium (split into Belgium-Flanders and Belgium-Wallonia, 
given different educational systems), Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK (again split according to the 
different educational systems into England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). Given the small sample 
sizes for second-generation migrants, we excluded Iceland, Ireland, Scotland and Northern Ireland. As for Italy, 
only Northern and Central are considered. We made this choice because of the well known territorial divide 
(students from the South perform much more poorly) and the limited presence of second-generation migrants in 
the South. An accurate measure of relative disadvantage must contrast second generation migrants with their 
native peers (therefore, natives in Northern and Central Italy). Data from Germany exclude students whose 
mother was born in former Soviet Union, since some indications (extremely high test scores, German as 
language spoken at home) make us suspicious of them being ethnic German return migrants.  
6
 We include the interaction term provided it is significant at the 5% level. This does not occur for Denmark, 
England and Wales, Spain, Greece, Italy and Sweden. 
7
 We divided the estimated coefficient of ESCS for natives by the root mean square error in order to obtain the 
same metric of our measure of migrant achievement penalty. This indicator of “socio-economic penalty” 
measures by how many standard deviations a native individual with ESCS = x-1 lags behind the achievement 
score of the native individual with ESCS=x. 
8
 This is equivalent to inspecting the change in the overall R-squared (in the usual linear models definition). 
